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Abstract  
Purpose - To examine the implicit beliefs both high potentials and HR directors hold about 
the terms of the exchange relationship between high potential employees and their 
organizations. We position the study within the framework of the psychological contract, 
exploring specifically whether strategic ambiguity and information asymmetries in high 
potential programs create a heightened risk of psychological contract breach. 
Design/methodology/approach - 20 high potentials and 11 HR directors from 9 different 
organizations were interviewed. Open and axial coding of the qualitative data was 
performed by three raters. 
Findings - Information asymmetry in high potential programs, indeed, poses a potential risk 
for psychological contract breach. Although strategic ambiguity can be an effective 
communication strategy in that it creates a power imbalance in favor of the organization, at 
all times a delicate balance must be maintained between leaving room for flexibility and 
intuitive decision making, and creating perceived promises in high potential employees that 
are subsequently broken. In fact, through information asymmetry organizations run the risk 
of achieving the exact opposite of the goals they had for their high potential programs in the 
first place. 
Originality/value – Hardly any research has been done on the psychological effects of 
identifying a very small proportion of an organization’s workforce as high potentials. In 
addition, research contrasting employee and employer beliefs about psychological contract 
terms is scarce. 
Keywords High potential programs, Talent management, Workforce differentiation, 
Psychological contract breach, Signaling theory, Strategic ambiguity, Information 
Asymmetry 
Paper type Research paper
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Information Asymmetry in High Potential Programs a Potential Risk for Psychological 
Contract Breach  
Introduction 
Studies estimate that between 40 and 60 percent of global companies have high 
potential programs in place (Pepermans et al., 2003; Silzer and Church, 2010; Slan and 
Hausdorf, 2004; Slan-Jerusalim and Hausdorf, 2007). Also called high-flyer or fast-track 
development programs (Altman, 1997; Baruch and Peiperl; 1997; Feild and Harris, 1991; 
Garavan and Morley, 1997), these programs encompass the systematic identification, 
socialization, and development of cohorts of employees seen as having high potential for a 
top management position, or for advancement to a higher level of responsibility more 
generally (Larsen et al., 1998; Silzer and Church, 2010). Inspired by a ‘war for talent’ 
discourse (Michaels et al., 2001), companies have become convinced that they should 
groom their most talented employees (i.e., their ‘A players’) for positions of strategic 
importance, whilst directing their ‘B players’ towards support positions, and their ‘C players’ 
towards the exit (Huselid et al., 2005). Hence, the underlying principle of high potential 
programs is workforce differentiation—i.e., the investment of disproportionate resources 
where one expects disproportionate returns (Becker et al., 2009; Collings and Mellahi, 2009; 
Huselid and Becker, 2011; Ledford and Kochanski, 2004). 
The notion of the war for talent is rooted in two main assumptions (Beechler and 
Woodward, 2009). First, that in a knowledge economy context traditional sources of 
competitive advantage are losing their edge whereas human talent is a renewable resource 
not easily copied or stolen by competitors. Second, that attracting and retaining ‘high 
potential’ employees is becoming increasingly difficult as a result of specific demographic 
and psychological contract trends. Increasingly, organizations worry that a consumerist 
attitude is taking hold of their employees—in which the organization is considered a 
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resource to the individual just as much as the other way around (Inkson, 2008). A typical 
target for high potential programs, then, is to increase the commitment, engagement, and 
loyalty of those employees the organization can least afford to lose (Vloeberghs et al., 2005).  
Somewhat paradoxically—considering their focus on achieving retention and 
commitment through differentiation—the typical mode of communication about high 
potential programs seems to be ‘strategic ambiguity’, meaning that openness and clarity are 
deliberately avoided (Eisenberg, 1984) thus creating information asymmetries in which one 
party (i.e., the organization) has more or better information than the other (i.e., the high 
potential employee) (Stiglitz, 2002). Organizations are typically afraid that communicating 
openly and clearly about their high potential programs will cause arrogance in those selected 
for the program, and jealousy in those not selected (Larsen et al., 1998). Consequently, less 
than one in three organizations disclose information about their high potential programs to 
employees—and when they do, information is often exchanged in a very informal manner 
(Bournois and Rousillon, 1992; Dries and Pepermans, 2008; Silzer and Church, 2010). This 
might lead to a number of issues.  
First of all, according to Becker and Huselid (2006), in order to guarantee the 
retention of ‘A players’, career opportunities need to be clearly communicated. In their 
study of 199 high potential managers, Campbell and Smith (2008) found that those who 
were formally identified as high potentials displayed significantly less job search behavior 
than those who were informally identified—receiving formal recognition was considered 
very important by the study participants. Moreover, the literature on perceived 
organizational justice suggests that being transparent about high potential programs might 
be an important buffer to perceptions of unfairness among employees not identified as high 
potentials (Gelens et al., 2013; Slan-Jerusalim and Hausdorf, 2007). Second, even when 
organizations (think that they) are not openly communicating about their high potential 
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policies, they are still communicating—which is the central tenet of signaling theory 
(Connelly et al., 2011). HRM scholars estimate that even under conditions of strategic 
ambiguity, information about high potential programs ‘leaks’ to employees in 90 percent of 
cases (Bournois and Rousillon, 1992). We posit that the signals organizations advertently or 
inadvertently send out about their high potential programs—conveyed, for instance, by 
performance reviews, compensation and benefits decisions, training manuals, and 
procedural changes (O’Neill et al., 2007)—will feed into the implicit assumptions high 
potential employees hold about their relationship with their employer (Suazo et al., 2009).  
Theoretical Framework 
Employee perceptions of the rules of the exchange relationship they have with their 
employer, and of the resources that are exchanged, are typically referred to as 
‘psychological contracts’ (Höglund, 2012; Rousseau, 1995; Shaw et al., 2009). 
Psychological contracts thus express  employees’ inferred interpretations of explicit and 
implicit promises made by their organizations (Conway and Briner, 2009). Although they 
are not legally binding in terms of creating a mutually shared agreement between employers 
and their employees (Suazo et al., 2009), many studies have demonstrated that the effects of 
psychological contract breach—defined as an employee’s perception regarding the extent to 
which his or her organization has failed to fulfill its promises or obligations (Robinson and 
Rousseau, 1994)—can be as devastating as those of legal contract breach (Zhao et al., 2007).  
In the present, qualitative study we investigate the implicit beliefs both participants 
in high potential programs and the developers of those programs (i.e., HR directors) hold 
about the terms of the exchange relationship between high potential employees and their 
organizations. We are particularly interested in examining the extent to which these beliefs 
are mutual, considering the indications in the literature that these programs are often poorly 
communicated to employees (Bournois and Rousillon, 1992) whilst the stakes of potentially 
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losing high potential employees to the competition are high (Vloeberghs et al., 2005). We 
position our findings within the framework of psychological contract theory, exploring 
specifically whether information asymmetry in high potential programs creates a heightened 
risk of psychological contract breach (Lester et al., 2002). In so doing, we aim to contribute 
to the literature on high potential programs—situated mostly within the talent management 
domain (Silzer and Church, 2010)—on the one hand, and to the literature on psychological 
contracts on the other.  
Talent management research is generally positioned within a strategic HRM, or a 
resource-based view (RBV) framework (Collings and Mellahi, 2009), which means that it is 
typically studied from the perspective of organizational strategy makers rather than 
individual employees (Gelens et al., 2013; Huselid and Becker, 2011). To date, hardly any 
research has been done on the psychological effects of identifying a very small proportion of 
an organization’s workforce as high potentials (typically 5 percent) on employees—whilst 
the satisfaction and commitment of the participants in high potential programs is a crucial 
concern to organizations (Feild and Harris, 1991). We argue that examining the 
psychological dynamics at play in high potential programs is an important addition to the 
literature, in order to fully grasp the implications of this type of HRM interventions. 
Humans, after all, cannot be expected to react as rationally and predictably to strategic 
decisions as other ‘resources’ do (Inkson, 2008).  
As for the literature on the psychological contract, there have been calls in recent 
years for more research on the ways in which it is influenced by organizational-level 
variables (Guest and Conway, 2002; Guzzo and Noonan, 1994; Suazo et al., 2009). 
Although Rousseau, in her seminal work on the psychological contract (i.e., Rousseau, 1989, 
1995), acknowledged that it is formed both by individual predispositions and interpretations 
and by organizational messages and social cues, an overwhelming majority of studies has 
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studied the psychological contract from the employee perspective alone (Conway and Briner, 
2009)—claiming that whether or not employees make accurate assessments of the promises 
made by their organizations is irrelevant in determining their attitudinal and behavioral 
reactions to perceived breach (Robinson, 1996). At its origins, however, the concept of the 
psychological contract did include the perspective of organizational agents, as well (March 
and Simon, 1958). As the psychological contract is essentially an exchange concept, it is 
somewhat puzzling that research contrasting employee and employer beliefs about 
psychological contract terms is scarce (De Cuyper et al., 2008).  
In the current study, we examine both employee and employer assumptions about the 
terms and conditions of participating in a high potential program, because we are interested 
to see whether the information asymmetries often inherent to these programs might lead to 
differences in perception between the different parties involved. In line with Rousseau’s 
(2011) call for more research on the processes that create agreement versus disagreement 
about psychological contract terms, we hypothesize that large discrepancies between 
employee and employer beliefs may be precursors to psychological contract breach among 
high potential employees (Lester et al., 2002). 
Psychological Contracts of ‘Special’ Employee Categories  
In recent years, respected authors have stated that in order to advance the 
psychological contract literature theoretically, we need to come to a better understanding of 
differences between groups of workers in relation to the psychological contract (Isaksson et 
al., 2009). Indeed, an increasing interest is observed in the psychological contracts of 
specific employee categories, such as contingent workers (e.g., McLean Parks et al., 1998; 
De Cuyper and De Witte, 2006), minority groups (e.g., Chrobot-Mason, 2003), core versus 
peripheral workers (e.g., Lepak and Snell, 1999; Rousseau and McLean Parks, 1993), 
volunteers (e.g., Vantilborgh et al., 2012), and employees who have managed to negotiate 
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‘i-deals’ (i.e., personalized work arrangements allotted on an individual basis; Rousseau et 
al., 2006).  
We propose that entry into a high potential program is a critical incident in the 
(re)formation of the terms of the exchange relationship between employees selected for such 
programs, and their employers. Signaling theory proposes that HRM practices—through 
their impact on employee perceptions of the type of behavior that is rewarded by the 
organization—play a central role in shaping psychological contract beliefs (Höglund, 2012; 
Guzzo and Noonan, 1994; Suazo et al., 2009). As for high potential programs, specifically, 
being identified as a high potential signals an employee’s value to his or her current 
organization, but not elsewhere. A typical target for high potential programs is to accelerate 
the development of employees with high potential for advancement up the organizational 
career ladder, so that their talent “becomes more rapidly available” to their organizations 
(Vloebergs et al., 2005, p. 547). Thus, being identified as a high potential implies larger 
investments on the side of the organization in a person’s internal career development (Dries 
and Pepermans, 2008; Höglund, 2012; Silzer and Dowell, 2010). Special inducements often 
follow immediately after identification, ranging from special benefits and training programs 
to the prospect of a potential promotion to a management position (Larsen et al., 1998).  
In a 2008 interview study, high potentials reported that their formal nomination as a 
‘special’ member of the organization withheld them from accepting outside job offers, since 
they perceived their advancement within the organization as more ‘guaranteed’ than 
external opportunities for advancement (Dries and Pepermans, 2008). In general, employees 
identified as high potentials seem to believe that they would most likely be worse off 
changing employers (Lazear, 2009). One reason lies in the fact that employees may doubt 
that their special status would transfer to another organization (Ng and Feldman, 2008). 
Another reason might be that the allocation of the high potential label makes high potential 
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employees feel adequately rewarded (i.e., in line with their market value), and so there is no 
incentive to try to better themselves (De Cuyper et al., 2011). We posit, however, that these 
beneficial psychological effects might not occur (or, at least, to a lesser extent) under 
conditions of strategic ambiguity.  
Strategic Ambiguity, Information Asymmetry, and Psychological Contract Breach 
As mentioned earlier, most organizations report to have adopted strategic ambiguity 
as a communication strategy for their high potential programs (Bournois and Rousillon, 
1992; Dries and Pepermans, 2008; Silzer and Church, 2010). Strategic ambiguity is defined 
as follows: “the deliberate use of ambiguity in strategic communication in order to create a 
‘space’ in which multiple interpretations by stakeholders are enabled and to which multiple 
stakeholder responses are possible” (Davenport and Leitch, 2005, p. 1604). According to 
Eisenberg (1984), although many authors in organizational communication seem to equate 
effective communication with open communication, clarity and openness are in fact 
nonsensical standards for effective communication. In fact, from a strategic communication 
point of view, clarity and openness are only measures of communicative competence if one 
has as a goal to be clear (p. 230).  
Most organizations are hesitant to communicate openly and clearly about their high 
potential programs for the following reasons: fears of creating high expectations in terms of 
promotions, development opportunities, and resources that the organization might not be 
prepared to provide (Silzer and Church, 2010); fears of ‘crown prince syndrome’, a 
phenomenon whereby people who believe they are assured a spot in their organization’s 
senior management (much like crown princes) lose their motivation to work for it (Dries, 
2013; Göbel-Kobialka, 1998); fears of losing leeway to make promotion decisions based on 
gut feelings rather than standardized assessments (Highhouse, 2008); and fears of creating 
peer jealousies and a competitive climate (Bothner et al., 2011; Larsen et al., 1998). We call 
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the ambiguity surrounding high potential programs (at least, from the viewpoint of the 
employees participating in them) ‘strategic’ because most organizations with opaque high 
potential policies deliberately utilize ambiguous promotion criteria to keep their high 
potentials on their toes (cf. tenure criteria in academe; Yining et al., 2006).  
According to signaling theory, however, any form of communication by the 
organization or an agent of the organization (e.g., direct supervisor, HR staff, colleague)—
ambiguous or not—can be interpreted by an employee as a promise that can create a 
psychological contract (Connelly et al., 2011; Conway and Briner, 2009; Rousseau, 1995). 
Therefore, information asymmetries between participants in high potential programs and the 
developers of those programs (i.e., HR directors) are likely to trigger incorrect assumptions 
in high potential employees about promises made by the organization (Dries et al., 2012). 
When employees have little information about organizational practices, they will ‘fill in the 
blanks’ using whatever cues or signals they receive from the organization (e.g., positive 
feedback, satisfactory performance ratings; Suazo et al., 2009).  
Among the most likely causes of psychological contract breach are perceived 
inadequacy of HR practices, a lack of trust in management, discrepancies between employee 
and HR beliefs about the employment relationship, and perceptions of differential treatment 
as compared to coworkers (Conway and Briner, 2009)—all of which are likely to be 
induced or worsened by strategic ambiguity (Suazo et al., 2009). Therefore, we posit that 
the information asymmetries that emanate from strategic ambiguity in high potential 
programs are at risk of causing psychological contract breach in high potentials. In what 
follows, we explain how we collected and analyzed the qualitative data used to examine this 
hypothesis.  
Method 
Organizational Contexts 
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We obtained the participation of nine organizations, identified as best practice 
organizations by a major consulting company, spanning six different industries (see Table 1). 
Prescreening interviews were conducted to find out more about each organization’s high 
potential program. Table 1 presents an overview of the characteristics of each participating 
organization and their high potential program. As can be seen in the table, the participating 
organizations differed in terms of: (1) the percentage of employees identified as high 
potentials on an annual basis (percentages ranged from 0.05 to 10); (2) the degree of 
formalization of their high potential programs (‘low’ indicating that decisions are made 
based mostly on gut feelings; ‘medium’ that there are policies in place but that these are not 
binding; and ‘high’ that decisions relating to the program are highly formalized); and (3) the 
degree of strategic ambiguity in their high potential programs (‘low’ indicating that the 
organization communicates openly and clearly about the program to all of its employees; 
‘medium’ that high potential employees are informed about the program, but not other 
employees; and ‘high’ indicating that the organization does not disclose much information 
about its high potential program, not even to program participants).  
Although the data summarized in Table 1 indicate some heterogeneities in our 
sample, all participating organizations met specific predefined inclusion criteria. First of all, 
the organizations’ definition of a high potential program needed to correspond to that of the 
study (see Introduction). Second, they had to be able to present an official list of program 
participants. Third, organizations were not allowed to compose ad-hoc lists of their high 
potential employees especially for the study; only people identified as high potentials at 
least one year prior to the study were considered for an interview. 
—Insert Table 1 about here— 
Sample and Procedure 
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Data were collected through semi-structured interviews conducted with HR directors 
and employees identified as high potentials. We interviewed 11 HR directors (organizations 
3 and 4 both had two HR directors, one for general HR matters and another one for their 
high potential program specifically), 6 male and 5 female. The average age of the HR 
directors was 38.75 (sd = 3.49); their average organizational tenure was 14.25 years (sd = 
2.54). Each of the interviewed HR directors selected one or more employees knowingly 
identified as high potentials within their organization as interviewees. Twenty high 
potentials agreed to an interview. Whether or not these high potentials had formal 
knowledge of their status depended on their organization’s policies (see Table 1). All of 
them were aware either formally or informally, however, of the fact that they were identified 
as high potentials by their organizations. Four female and sixteen male high potentials were 
interviewed, with a mean age of 33.05 (sd = 6.09), and an average organizational tenure of 
6.10 years (sd = 2.75).  
All interviews took place in the participating organizations’ offices during office 
hours and lasted between one and two hours. Semi-structured interview guides were 
developed to ensure a certain degree of standardization between the interviews. The HR 
directors were invited to tell us about their organization’s high potential program s and what 
they expected of their high potential employees. The high potential interviewees, from their 
side, were asked what they expected from the high potential program. Interviews were 
conducted in Dutch; the quotes and codes reported in this paper were translated into English 
after completion of the analyses.  
Each individual interviewee was assigned a two-digit code indicating whether he or 
she was an HR director (HR) or a high potential (HP), his or her employing organization 
(first number of the code), and reference number within the organization (second number of 
the code). This allows the reader to link the interview quotes reported in the Results section 
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and in Appendix A and B to the organizational characteristics reported in Table 1 without 
compromising participant anonymity.   
Analyses  
All interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed verbatim with permission of 
the interviewees. Coding of the data was performed using ATLAS.ti (5.0). Data were 
analyzed as they were collected, through an iterative coding process conducted by multiple 
raters. The first stage of analysis involved thematic content analysis based on open coding—
i.e., “the process of breaking down, examining, comparing, conceptualizing, and 
categorizing data” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p. 61). Using open coding allowed us to 
explore the ideas that were captured in the raw interview data (Corbin and Strauss, 2008; 
DeCuir-Gunby et al., 2011). As similarities and differences emerged throughout the coding 
process, a coding scheme reflecting underlying constructs was developed by clustering 
codes together to make categories (see Appendix A and B). First, the two authors along with 
a third subject matter expert (SME) independently carried out preliminary coding on a 
sample of five transcripts. These codes were exchanged and discussed, leading up to the 
development of two initial coding schemes—one for the HR director interviews and one for 
the high potential interviews. For each code, a definition was formulated, based on the data, 
the insights of the three raters and the literature. A code was considered reliable when all 
three raters agreed that it reflected a separate category of the interview data (i.e., when 
excerpts from the interview were assigned to the same coding category, and not to another, 
by all three raters). Second, we coded an additional five transcripts and optimized the initial 
coding schemes based on their independent analyses. Finally, in the last step of the iterative 
open coding process, we independently coded all transcripts using the final coding schemes. 
For each code, the final coding schemes contained a label, a definition and a sample excerpt 
(see Appendix A and B).  
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In the second stage of analysis, axial coding was performed—i.e., “a set of 
procedures whereby data are put back together in new ways after open coding, by making 
connections between categories” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p. 96) (see Figure 1). Axial 
coding involves the selection of a core category, which refers to that category of data that 
accounts for most of the variation of the central phenomenon of concern and around which 
all other categories are integrated (Kendall, 1999). As shown in Figure 1, we selected 
‘disagreement between high potential employees and HR directors about the terms of the 
exchange relationship between high potentials and their organizations’ as our core category.  
First, we analyzed and discussed the relationships between the final codes described in the 
two coding schemes. Second, we developed a ‘paradigm model’ of the data (Figure 1)—i.e., 
an organizing scheme that connects subcategories of data to a central idea or phenomenon 
(in our case, information asymmetry in high potential programs) to help researchers think 
systematically about their data and pose questions about how different categories in the data 
relate to each other (Strauss and Corbin, 1990).  
Findings 
Based on the open coding conducted in the first stage of our qualitative analysis, we 
developed two final coding schemes—one for the HR director interviews and one for the 
high potential interviews—to describe the most important themes in our data (see Appendix 
A and Appendix B). As the Appendices show, we found three categories of implicit beliefs 
relating to the terms of the exchange relationship between high potential employees and 
their organizations that appeared to be mutually shared by HR director and high potential 
interviewees: ‘training and development’, ‘networking’,  and ‘career advancement and 
planning’. In addition to the three mutual categories, two categories of implicit beliefs were 
identified in the data that were only mentioned by the HR directors: ‘performance’ and 
‘ambition and drive’ (see Appendix A). We also identified two categories of implicit beliefs 
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mentioned only by high potential interviewees: ‘privileged position’ and ‘financial rewards’ 
(see Appendix B). 
As our findings will demonstrate, much disagreement was found between HR 
directors and high potentials about the terms of the exchange relationship between high 
potential employees and their organizations. Even the ‘mutual’ categories revealed 
conflicting expectations held by high potentials and HR directors, especially in terms of 
which party in the exchange relationship they hold accountable for success or failure of the 
high potential program.  
Disagreement About the Terms of the Exchange Relationship 
When comparing the interview data of the HR directors with that of the high 
potentials, the most significant finding is that both parties seem to hold the other 
accountable for managing high potentials’ careers. A good illustration of the conflicting 
expectations held by high potentials and HR directors can be found in the implicit beliefs 
with respect to training and development. High potentials expect their organizations to offer 
them interesting and exclusive training opportunities, whereas organizations expect their 
high potentials to proactively look for interesting training opportunities themselves, express 
their interest in specific programs, and request information from HR about how to register 
for them. As concerns networking, the high potential interviewees report that they expect 
their organizations to organize all sorts of activities which will allow them to demonstrate 
their capabilities and enhance their visibility within the organization, such as breakfast 
meetings with the board. The HR directors, on the other hand, expect their high potentials to 
network for themselves (both in terms of political and knowledge networking; see Appendix 
A), and make sure their skills and talents are visible to higher management. As for career 
advancement and planning, high potentials expect their organizations to create promotion 
opportunities as well as customized career tracks, whilst simultaneously allowing their high 
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potential employees to take their careers into their own hands and manage it themselves. HR 
directors, from their side, expect high potential employees to demonstrate a proactive and 
realistic attitude towards career planning: 
 The initiative has to lie with the person him or herself […] if they’re not pushing for it themselves the 
impression will be created that they don’t want [it] that badly. We’ll coach our employees, but if 
they’re a high potential, they won’t wait for that. (HR3.1) 
Axial coding of our interview data allowed us to dig deeper into the core category in 
our data—i.e., disagreement between high potential employees and HR directors about the 
terms of the exchange relationship between high potentials and their organizations (see 
Figure 1). In what follows, we analyze the conflicting expectations held by high potentials 
and HR directors, as well as their potential causes and effects, in more detail.  
—Insert Figure 1 about here— 
Expected by High Potentials 
Across the mutual and unique categories of implicit beliefs, the three most salient 
themes in the high potential data—which we argue, are most indicative of their end of the 
psychological contract—were organizational support and career guidance, special treatment, 
and adequate financial and psychological rewards. Specifically, high potentials believe that 
their entry into the high potential program implies that the organization will provide special 
support in achieving their career goals: 
Once you’re on that [high potential] list, and you’re not satisfied in your job anymore […] they’ll say 
“OK, let’s look at all possible positions for you here at [company], what would you like to do next” 
[…] I feel so comfortable in this situation. (HP3.2) 
In addition, high potentials expect their organization to include them in high-level 
projects commissioned by important clients, resulting in higher levels of responsibility and 
increased opportunities to make an impact on the organizational bottom line. They also 
expect equitable financial returns for their continued efforts. The relationship between being 
identified as a high potential and financial rewards is not always a positive one, however. 
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Around half of the high potentials interviewed reported that their salary and bonuses were at 
the same—if not at a lower—level than that of some of their non-high potential colleagues. 
The fact that their high potential status was not rewarded by a higher salary was perceived 
as ambiguous and confusing: 
It’s a bit frustrating […] I know what […] everyone else is getting compared to what I’m getting […] 
I wonder, if I’m such a high potential, how come I’m making only half of what others are making 
who are at the same level, and who I know for a fact are not identified as high potentials? (HP7.2) 
Expected by HR Directors 
Across the mutual and unique categories of implicit beliefs, the three most salient 
themes in the HR director interviews—which we argue, are most indicative of their end of 
the psychological contract—were employee initiative and proactivity, a consistent track 
record of excellent performance, and patience and realism in terms of career planning. 
Performance was the most frequently mentioned category among HR directors. All HR 
directors interviewed considered it self-evident that high potentials should consistently 
maintain a flawless performance record and deliver a unique and obvious contribution to 
their organization’s strategic mission: 
If you don’t live up to expectations, you’re out […] If you look at the number of hipos, they are 
around 3 or 4% of the population. The next level, [which we call] the corporate hipos, who we see as 
capable for even more senior roles in the organization, refers to less than 1% of the population. So 
that’s at least 2 out of 3 that will drop out at some point […] if, at a certain point—because we review 
everyone annually—you’re not achieving that performance standard anymore, you’re probably out. 
(HR4.2) 
In addition, HR directors expect high potentials to take the lead in managing their 
own careers, and to demonstrate a high level of ambition in terms of showing perseverance: 
 [We are not] going to do it for them. We’re not going to look for courses they can take. We’re not 
going to recommend books they should read. We’re not going to help them self-coach. No […] we 
offer support, the door is open, feel free to drop by. But it’s in your own hands […] not many people 
are up for that. (HR6) 
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The HR directors also stressed that being identified as a high potential does not mean 
that rapid career advancement is guaranteed. They expressed some irritation as to the—
according to them—‘unrealistic’ expectations the employees in their organization’s high 
potential program had about career advancement: 
In the last few years I’ve increasingly been confronted with young people who are expecting to move 
really, really fast. That desire for speed is inherent to the concept of a high potential I guess […] but 
there are limits […] it can be challenging to adjust their expectations sometimes (HR4.1) 
Evidence of Information Asymmetry in High Potential Programs 
 Plenty of evidence was found in the interview data for the occurrence of information 
asymmetries in high potential programs, whereby information about the programs was 
deliberately withheld from participants. Many of the HR directors we interviewed talked 
about actions taken by the organization ‘behind the scenes’, so as to avoid having to 
communicate openly about who is, and who is not, part of the high potential program: 
If there are only 15 available seats in a training program and we have 14 high potentials in our 
program, yes, we’ll make sure that the high potentials are enrolled first. But this all takes place at the 
‘hidden’ level […] we have no intention of communicating about that. That is why I shut my door [for 
this interview]. It would be as though a bomb went off in here. (HR7) 
Fears of creating ‘career guarantees’, of creating arrogance in high potentials, 
jealousy and frustration in non-high potentials, and of being overly bound to rules and 
regulations were typically used to legitimize the choice for a communication mode of 
strategic ambiguity. A number of HR directors also expressed that they severely disliked the 
term ‘high potential’, and therefore had instructed their organization’s managers not to use it 
in front of employees: 
Calling them ‘high potentials’ […] seems to imply that all other employees are ‘low potentials’. I 
consider it a dirty word, sort of. Just like talent. It’s just a very difficult topic area to communicate 
about. “Talent, what do you mean? I’m not in the program, so I don’t have talent?” (HR3)  
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The HR directors also expressed doubts about the quality of the communication 
skills of their organization’s managers (i.e., the direct supervisors of the employees in the 
high potential program):  
This is a type of information that you don’t want shared with employees without boundaries or 
structure. You have to teach managers how to spot talent and how to communicate about it. Right now, 
I’m not feeling very confident [that we’re doing it well]. When I see some of our people leave the 
[talent review] meetings […] I can’t even begin to imagine how they interpret what they heard and 
how they are going to convey that to their subordinates… And then I think, how is that person ever, 
using the right words and putting things in the right perspective, going to deliver that feedback? (HR9) 
Interestingly, we found no apparent connection between an organization’s actual 
high potential policies (as reported by the HR directors; see Table 1), and the experience of 
strategic ambiguity and information asymmetries on the part of the high potentials. To the 
contrary—we found both instances of high potentials in ‘high ambiguity’ contexts reporting 
that the terms and conditions of the program were clearly communicated to them, and 
instances of high potentials in ‘low ambiguity’ contexts reporting they had no idea what the 
program they were in was about: 
[Company] has a program for high potentials and everyone knows that […] because you can tell from 
certain things […] But they don’t communicate openly about what the program implies and I find that 
unfortunate […] I think it would be much, much better to openly discuss people’s available career 
options with them […] otherwise it’s a guessing game. (HP6.1)  
A possible explanation for this latter finding might be that direct supervisors often go 
against the official guidelines prescribed by the organization in their communications about 
the high potential program: 
The official directive is no communication, at least no direct communication. This means that, if 
communication happens at all, it should be along general lines like “we believe in you and we’re 
going to get you the necessary training” et cetera. And again, there are going to be managers who 
want to be completely transparent about it […] and who show all of their subordinates exactly where 
they are on the nine-box grid [i.e., the organization’s performance appraisal framework]. (HR1) 
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Information asymmetries were not only the result of strategic ambiguity; other 
factors were at play, as well. First of all, the different interests and agendas of HR directors 
and high potentials (i.e., employees are resources to organizations, and organizations are 
resources to employees’ careers) are likely to cause selective perception effects, in which 
each party in the employment relationship ‘hears what they want to hear’. Second, both 
parties have differential access to information. Whereas HR directors have more information 
about the high potential program, the high potentials have more knowledge of how the 
program is actually experienced by its participants (bearing in mind that they often receive 
information from their direct supervisors unofficially, possibly without the HR department 
being aware of it). Third, some of the HR directors we interviewed indicated that although 
they would like to communicate more openly about their high potential program, they feel it 
is impossible to do so because they are unhappy about the state the program is in. These 
interviewees typically felt they needed to improve the program first, before they could even 
consider transparency towards participants:  
The problem is, we conducted the reviews, we know where all of them are, but we don’t do anything 
more about it […] Since we’ve been restructuring, all those beautiful promises […] we haven’t been 
able to follow up on the talent reviews […] We [the HR department] are so busy that we don’t have 
any time left over to work on the high potential program. It will get better, but right now it’s just not a 
priority. (HR8)  
Potential Effects of Information Asymmetry in High Potential Programs  
For organizations, information asymmetry in high potential programs can be 
beneficial in that it tends to stimulate those with a tendency for overachieving and 
perfectionism—a shoe that fits many high potential employees. Because criteria for 
advancement are ambiguous, HR directors argue, those who are most motivated and driven 
will work even harder so as to make sure they meet the requirements. Other advantages of 
information asymmetry are that the less information high potential program participants 
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have about the program, the less they can pin down their organization’s management on 
promises made; and that strategic ambiguity creates freedom to make decisions (for instance, 
about who gets to participate in the program and who does not) based on gut feelings rather 
than standardized criteria. As mentioned earlier, the HR directors we interviewed reported 
that the line managers in their organizations prefer to follow their own judgment when it 
comes to the high potential program, rather than having to comply with a set of rules and 
regulations: 
We wanted to develop a special tool for the identification of high potential employees, and we did […] but we 
got feedback [from management] along the lines of “we don’t really need this, we know who our key talents are 
and who isn’t and we don’t need any extra toolkit or framework or checklist for that”. (HR5) 
 The other side of the coin for organizations is that information asymmetries might 
lead to lowered morale (when employees get frustrated with the lack of information), health 
issues (when overachievement and perfectionistic tendencies lead to workaholism, stress 
and burnout), and gossip among employees about the high potential program. A very 
remarkable finding was that some organizations do not implement certain HR practices they 
would like to include in the high potential program out of fear of compromising the 
anonymity of the program participants (one HR director referred to this as ‘the tail wagging 
the dog’): 
We were thinking […] of assigning internal mentors to our high potentials. But since it is decided that 
we won’t communicate about the program […] it is difficult. So management [has told us] “we don’t 
really want to go forward with the internal mentor thing”. (HR3)  
As for the high potentials themselves, although information asymmetries 
have mostly negative effects for them (following the adage that ‘knowledge is 
power’) one possible advantage of strategic ambiguity in high potential programs is 
that it challenges them to assume accountability for their personal development, and 
allows for some (perceived) space for the negotiation of ‘i-deals’ (in the sense that 
INFORMATION ASYMMETRY IN HIGH POTENTIAL PROGRAMS 20 
 
under conditions of strategic ambiguity, high potentials feel less bound to 
standardized career tracks): 
I mean I can appreciate that they point out strengths and weaknesses to me or congratulate me on my 
strengths, but not that they are going to determine what my career will look like. And I don’t think 
they do that […] So I can’t say that I am on a standard career track or that they determine my career, 
or at least I hope not. (HP2.3) 
On the negative end, information asymmetry in high potential programs might lead 
to a heightened sensitivity to feedback in high potentials (in their attempts to collect ‘clues’ 
about where they stand in the program), and feelings of insecurity and anxiety caused by a 
lack of information about their opportunities for career advancement: 
The reason I wanted to leave [company] last year was that after months and months of being identified 
as a high potential […] it was just an empty box. There really was nothing in return. On top of that, 
because of the crisis in telecom, [company] had announced a salary freeze. I was becoming more and 
more convinced that my wage was not in line with my value. So I started shopping around on the 
market to find out what I was really worth. The result was that I got a contract offer for a significantly 
higher amount […] Out of loyalty for [company] I took that back to them and told them “I’m only 
staying if you let me help you develop a high potential program with more body to it, and if all high 
potential salaries are benchmarked against the market“. Both of my conditions were met, and so I ended 
up staying. (HP4.2) 
Discussion 
The goal of this study was to examine the implicit beliefs both high potentials HR 
directors hold about the terms of the exchange relationship between high potential 
employees and their organizations. We were particularly interested in examining the extent 
to which these beliefs are mutual, considering indications in the literature that the typical 
mode of communication about high potential programs is strategic ambiguity, which creates 
information asymmetries between organizations and employees. We positioned the study 
within the framework of the psychological contract, exploring specifically whether 
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information asymmetries in high potential programs create a heightened risk of 
psychological contract breach. 
Our findings indicate that information asymmetry in high potential programs, indeed, 
poses a potential risk for psychological contract breach in high potential employees. 
Although strategic ambiguity can be an effective communication strategy in that it creates a 
power imbalance in favor of the organization, at all times a delicate balance must be 
maintained between leaving room for flexibility and intuitive decision making, and creating 
perceived promises in high potential employees that are subsequently broken. In fact, as 
summarized in Figure 1, through information asymmetry organizations run the risk of 
achieving the exact opposite of the goals they had for their high potential programs in the 
first place—i.e., accelerating the development of their high potential employees in a 
controlled way, grooming them for top management positions, and increasing their 
commitment, engagement, and loyalty.  
Implications for HR Practice 
Organizations should never lose sight of the fact that the categorization of employees 
into ‘A, B, and C players’ is a strategic choice with important repercussions (Becker et al., 
2009). By labeling employees as high potentials, high expectations are created. The high 
potentials we interviewed reported to be quite frustrated and confused by their 
organization’s ambiguous communication about what the high potential program entails, 
exactly. The findings of our study imply that organizations—HR directors in particular—
seem to underestimate the expectations high potential programs create in their participants 
(Feild and Harris, 1991). Specifically, employees interpret entry into a high potential 
program as a signal from the organization that they can expect preferential treatment from 
now on, especially in terms of customized career support. Organizations, however, have a 
very different idea of the implications of being part of a high potential program. They see 
INFORMATION ASYMMETRY IN HIGH POTENTIAL PROGRAMS 22 
 
entry into the program mostly as an opportunity for high potential employees to demonstrate 
their capabilities and attract the attention of higher management. They take accountability 
mostly for the identification of high potentials—but after entry into the program, expect 
these to take their careers into their own hands.  
Since high potentials are typically the employees organizations are least willing to 
lose (Dries and Pepermans, 2008;Vloeberghs et al., 2005), it would be in the best interest of 
organizations to ‘manage’ these differences in perception.  One particular implication of our 
study, therefore, is the importance of deliberate psychological contract building with 
employees identified as high potentials, so as to align their implicit beliefs of what is 
expected of them, and what they can expect from their organization in turn, with the 
organizational agenda (Suazo et al., 2009). High potentials’ motives to stay with their 
employing organizations are often grounded in perceived career guarantees from the side of 
the organization rather than in feelings of loyalty per se (Baruch and Peiperl, 1997; Höglund, 
2012). Consequently, frustrating their expectations about the magnitude and pace of their 
career progression within the organization is likely to be detrimental to their commitment 
and engagement (Dries et al., 2013).  
As our findings show, strategic ambiguity in high potential programs might not only 
lead to confusion among the participants in these programs, but also to discrepancies 
between the organization’s official position and what line managers are actually saying and 
doing—fertile grounds for misunderstanding, gossip, and ultimately, psychological contract 
breach (Lester et al., 2002). Therefore, organizations making the choice for strategic 
ambiguity would do well to monitor whether they are unintentionally creating ‘grapevine’ 
communication activity undermining the goals of their high potential programs (Connelly et 
al., 2011; Suazo et al., 2009).  
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Strategic ambiguity and information asymmetries in high potential programs—when 
properly executed—are not without benefits, however. As our findings show, high 
potentials, indeed, intend to stay loyal to their organizations as they expect certain privileges 
in the future, without knowing exactly what, when and how. There is a fine line, however, 
between stimulating high potentials’ imagination and frustrating their expectations to such 
an extent that they leave the organization (Feild and Harris, 1991).  
Finally, the findings of our study imply that perceived effort-reward imbalances in 
terms of financial rewards can be detrimental to high potentials’ commitment, engagement, 
and intention to stay with the organization. We recommend that organizations monitor their 
high potentials’ expectations in this respect on an ongoing basis, as pay dissatisfaction is 
likely to lead to job search behavior and an increased openness to external job offers 
(Campbell and Smith 2008). Our data implies that ‘pay for potential’ might be a powerful 
tool for motivating and retaining high potential employees. Admittedly, cultural and 
institutional factors—such as the degree of unionization of a nation or sector—might inhibit 
the introduction of differential pay based on assessments of (something as intangible as) 
potential in specific countries or institutional settings (Dries and Pepermans, 2008). 
Nonetheless, voices in the HR literature (e.g., Becker et al., 2009; Lepak and Snell, 1999) 
are adamant that high potential programs cannot reach their envisioned goals without being 
aligned with differential reward systems.   
Study Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research 
The study reported in this paper was not without its limitations. First of all, the study 
was qualitative and not conducted on a scale that allows for representative conclusions 
about the high potential population as a whole. Since being identified as a high potential 
cannot be measured validly using self-report data, however, and organizations are usually 
hesitant to disclose archival data about their high potential population to researchers, the 
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high potential population is ‘unknown’ and representative sampling across organizations is 
impossible (Dries and Pepermans, 2008).  
Second, although we did prescreen participating organizations on a number of 
criteria, it proved difficult in our analyses to control for all possible heterogeneities in the 
high potential programs of the different organizations (see Table 1). Multilevel studies with 
representative samples per participating organization thus form a potential avenue for 
further research, which would allow for cross-validation of our findings. This would allow 
for a more in-depth analysis of organizational contexts, and of how specific features of high 
potential programs relate to participants’ psychological contracts. It would also allow us to 
study the extent to which information asymmetries have positive, versus negative effects—
and so help uncover the ‘optimal’ level of strategic ambiguity for high potential programs.   
Third, our interview sample did not include a control group of ‘non-high potentials’. 
As in most organizations only a minority (1 to 5 percent) of employees is identified as a 
high potential each year, it is clear that the risk of frustrating a large part of the 
organization’s workforce, career-wise—and thus, potentially causing psychological contract 
breach—is quite high. It would therefore be interesting to work with a control group of 
‘average’ employees in future studies to contrast their perceptions of their organizations’ 
high potential programs (if they are aware of them at all) to those of their high potential 
counterparts. This avenue for future research is particularly relevant considering the fact that 
negative reactions of non-high potentials to high potential programs are often used as a key 
argument in favor of strategic ambiguity (Dries and Pepermans, 2008; Larsen et al., 2008), 
even though there has hardly been any research on employee reactions to high potential 
programs (Gelens et al., 2013).  
Fourth, in the Introduction, we posited that entry into a high potential program can 
be seen as a ‘critical incident’ in the (re)formation of the terms of the exchange relationship 
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between high potentials and their employers. Although it is clear from our findings that 
being identified as a high potential has important implications for employees’ psychological 
contracts, longitudinal designs are needed to further explore the idea of program entry as a 
causal antecedent to psychological contract change (Rousseau, 2011).  
Concluding Remarks 
There is an urgent need for more research on ‘workforce differentiation’ from the 
perspective of employees (Huselid and Becker, 2011). From a rational-economic 
perspective, the differential treatment of employees based on their relative potential to 
contribute to the competitive advantage of their organizations is a (cost-)effective practice 
(Lepak and Snell, 1999). It remains unclear, however, how this type of unequal treatment 
affects both high potential and ‘non-high potential’ employees psychologically (Gelens et 
al., 2013). If we want to make statements about the effects of high potential programs on the 
commitment, loyalty, and engagement of high potential employees in a ‘war for talent’ 
context, we will need more research examining this type of HR practices from their 
perspective. 
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Table 1.  
Characteristics of the Participating Organizations and their High Potential Programs 
Organization 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
          Sector Headhunting Finance Electronics Telecom Security Pharmaceutics Finance Finance Electronics 
Organization size  500 180,000 360,000 75,000 300,000 100,000 85,000 8,000 115,000 
High potential population 10% 5% 2% 3.5% 0.5% 2.5% 0.05% 2% 2% 
Degree of formalization Low Medium High High Low High Medium Medium Medium 
Degree of strategic ambiguity Medium Low High Medium High Low Medium Medium Medium 
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Figure 1. Information asymmetry in high potential programs a potential risk for psychological contract breach (paradigm model developed 
through axial coding). 
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Potential effects for high potential employees 
Positive 
 Room for initiative and self-development 
 Negotiation space for ‘i-deals’ 
Negative 
 Feelings of insecurity and anxiety 
 Risk of workaholism and burnout 
 Heightened sensitivity to feedback 
 Lack of realistic career information Risk of psychological contract breach 
Barriers to openness and clarity 
 Fears of creating ‘career guarantees’ 
 Fears of creating arrogance in high potentials 
 Fears of creating jealousy in non-high potentials 
 Fears of being overly bound to rules and regulations 
Choice for strategic ambiguity 
Information asymmetry in high potential programs 
Disagreement about the terms of 
the exchange relationship 
between high potentials and 
their organizations 
Potential effects for organizations 
Positive 
 Overachievement tendencies are stimulated 
 No accountability for career outcomes 
 Freedom to make decisions based on gut feelings 
Negative 
 Risk of lowered morale, gossip, and health issues 
Expected by high potentials 
 Organizational support and career guidance 
 Special treatment (career customization) 
 Adequate rewards (financial, psychological) 
Expected by HR directors 
 Employee initiative/proactivity 
 Consistent track record of excellent performance 
 Patience/realism in terms of career planning 
Intended effects of high potential programs 
 Groom high potentials for top management positions 
 Accelerate the development of high potential employees 
 Increase high potential commitment, engagement, and loyalty 
 Be an employer of choice in a ‘war for talent’ environment 
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Appendix A.  
Final Coding Scheme for the HR Director Interviews (Developed through Iterative Open Coding) 
Code Definition Sample excerpt 
    1. Training and development   
     1.1. Self-initiated learning Keeping up to date through self-initiated 
learning experiences 
Learning agility, to me, is a key aspect of potential. People 
who adapt quickly, who are fast learners […] We’re not 
going to develop someone against their own will […] nor 
are we going to do it for them. We’re not going to look for 
courses they can take. We’re not going to recommend books 
they should read. We’re not going to help them self-coach. 
No […] we offer support, the door is open, feel free to drop 
by. But it’s in your own hands […] not many people are up 
for that. (HR6) 
 1.2. International experience Demonstrating a willingness and ability to 
go abroad for work 
One thing that we do especially for the hipos is this 
international mobility program, so we expect them to work 
one year, two years in another [company] office abroad. We 
don’t really push them if they don’t want to go […] 
although it’s recommended that they do for their career […] 
HQ expects us to move our key talents around 
internationally […] Pretty soon I expect it to become a 
criterion [for promotion]. (HR2) 
    2. Networking   
     2.1. Knowledge networking Engaging in knowledge networking (i.e. 
continuously exchanging ideas and 
information with subject matter experts) 
These are people with a natural aptitude for networking […] 
always hopping by people’s offices to exchange ideas […] 
when they’re doing a project they’ll ask people’s expert 
opinion […] They’ll involve lots of people in their projects 
and collect enormous amounts of information in a short 
period of time […] like taking a shortcut. (HR1) 
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 2.2. Political networking Engaging in political networking (i.e. 
seeking to establish relationships with 
important others) 
Trust me, if there is a luncheon somewhere, he [the high 
potential] will be there […] A salesman will go to an event 
and hand out lots of business cards and see everyone and 
talk to everyone. But a future leader, he’ll create an actual 
relationship […] He might not talk to twenty people, but 
he’ll talk to five, the most important ones. And he won’t 
just leave his card, they’ll know his wife’s and his 
children’s names and where he went on vacation […] I 
don’t know if I’m explaining it right, but that’s the 
difference [between] networking to sell and networking for 
success. (HR2) 
 2.3. Visibility Keeping up one’s visibility in the 
organization 
I think internal visibility is almost a prerequisite to being 
successful as a high potential […] making sure your PR is 
good […] If he [the high potential] really wants to make it 
in the organization, clearly he needs to perform well first, 
but also make sure that it’s noticed by the organization. Not 
only by his direct supervisor, but also by other people. I 
think most high potentials have that natural ability to sell 
themselves […] They usually like to be at the center of 
attention. (HR1) 
    3. Career advancement and planning  
     3.1. Proactivity  Communicating openly about career goals 
and ambitions 
They [high potentials] tend to grow out of their job much 
quicker […] And it’s a natural process because these people 
will come up to you and say  « Hey – I’ve been in this job 
for two years no. What’s my next step? » […] With the 
people that aren’t high potentials, you sometimes have to 
tell them that they it’s time to shake things up. But the high 
potentials will be knocking at your door every two years, 
asking for a new challenge. (HR4.1) 
 3.2. Realism Setting career goals that are realistic and 
achievable 
I’m going to sound like an old fart now […] but in the last 
few years I’ve increasingly been confronted with young 
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people who are expecting to move really, really fast. That 
desire for speed is inherent to the concept of a high potential 
I guess […] but there are limits. Some people want to 
change every year because « I need to evolve » […] And I 
tell them, you will be working for another 40 or 50 years 
[…] So at this speed […] what I’m trying to say is that it 
can be challenging to adjust their expectations sometimes 
(HR4.1) 
    4. Performance    
     4.1. High performance Demonstrating consistently high levels of 
performance 
We offer a clear framework where, if you don’t live up to 
expectations, you’re out […] If you look at the number of 
hipos, they are around 3 or 4% of the population. The next 
level, the corporate hipos, who we see as capable for even 
more senior roles in the organization, refers to less than 1% 
of the population. So that’s at least 2 out of 3 that will drop 
out at some point […] if, at a certain point – because we 
review everyone annually – you’re not achieving that 
performance standard anymore, you’re probably out. 
(HR4.2) 
 4.2. Contribution Making a critical contribution to the 
organization 
If you want to be a high potential it’s not only about 
networking but also, making an actual contribution. We 
have a framework called Drive, Focus, Impact, and Guide 
[…] It’s not scientifically validated or anything, it grew 
pragmatically. I know a lot of people who are very 
intelligent and do a very good job, but they’re not leaving a 
mark on the organization. It’s about drive and impact and 
showing that you contribute something tangible to the 
organization’s core business. (HR3.2) 
    5. Ambition and drive   
     5.1. Initiative Taking initiative to showcase one’s talents The initiative has to lie with the person him or herself […] 
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They can have the best manager in the world, if they’re not 
pushing for it themselves the impression will be created that 
they don’t want to advance within the company that badly. 
We’ll coach our employees, but if they’re a high potential, 
they won’t wait for that. Because those people [...] 
invariably, always want to progress faster than the standard 
programs we’re offering” (HR3.1) 
 5.2. Commitment Committing to tasks, roles or assignments 
that are important to the organization  
The fact that you’re a high potential also implies high 
commitment […] If they [management] say « There’s this 
project, do you want to collaborate? » and you say no, I’ll 
just work nine to five and nothing beyond that […] or 
there’s an interesting opportunity to work abroad for six 
months […] OK, there’s a good and a bad time for 
everything but if you repeatedly turn down opportunities 
like that you don’t deserve the [high potential] label […] if 
you’re not going the extra mile for the company […] Then 
by all means, just keep doing what you’re doing but not as a 
high potential. (HR7) 
 5.3. Perseverance Demonstrating perseverance throughout 
one’s career within the organization 
I think any career is a combination of getting chances, 
creating chances, and taking chances. And being patient and 
perseverant […] I believe that true talent will always surface 
at some point. But also, that it’s hard work […] In my 
opinion, if you really want to establish a solid career in 
business you need six or seven years […] avoid job-hopping 
every two years because you’re impatient […] When you 
start something you need to see it through and work hard, 
really hard, but in that particular business. And if you keep 
that up long enough, you’ll get a chance to truly build 
something solid, like a team of your own. (HR2) 
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Appendix B. 
Final Coding Scheme for the High Potential Interviews (Developed through Iterative Open Coding) 
Code Definition Sample excerpt 
    1. Training and development    
     1.1. Training programs Offering exclusive access to training 
programs 
As for the MBA… Again, that relates to my nomination 
[as a high potential]. They don’t just do that for anyone. 
You have to apply for it and then the organization decides 
yes or no. But when you’re a high potential it’s basically 
a given that you’ll get it […] because an entire selection 
process already preceded your nomination [as a high 
potential]. (HP4.2) 
 1.2. Mentoring Assigning a personal mentor to each high 
potential 
Being identified as a talent offers the advantage that 
there’s follow-up on an individual basis. They look at the 
major points where you can improve and then a number 
of people from higher up will follow up on that and 
recommend courses and other sorts of developmental 
activities […] Since last year I officially have a personal 
mentor […] which is definitely not for everyone and I’m 
very aware of it […] He’s very high-level and he reserves 
one hour for me every two months to talk about me and 
my experiences. I feel really spoiled. (HP3.2) 
 1.3. International assignments Offering opportunities to work 
internationally 
[…] and after that, I’d like to go abroad for a few years. 
It’s sort of an unwritten law that if you really want to 
advance in the company that you establish relationships 
with [company] departments in other countries […] so I 
expect that they’ll send me abroad for three or five years 
[…] with the whole family of course. And then we’ll see 
how we like it there and how long we want to stay. 
(HP3.1) 
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2. Networking   
     2.1. Access to networks Offering access to influential networks At that first stretch entry point session we each got to talk 
to [company’s] big boss […] which is a big deal, getting 
to talk to him personally. They [HR] arranged that and I 
think it will definitely happen again, because I just started 
in the track […] Also internationally, a lot of people are 
identified [as high potentials] across many countries and 
we’re going to meet them in a number of events in the 
near future. (HP4.1) 
 2.2. Visibility Organizing activities that enhance 
visibility 
You seem to automatically end up in all of these 
workshops based on the fact that your name is on that 
[high potential] list […] and when certain themes come 
up and they’re looking for a spokesperson for that […] 
you automatically step into the picture without really 
having to do anything for it. (HP3.2) 
 2.3. Exclusive group membership Creating an exclusive group in the 
organization reserved only for high 
potentials 
[Company] has this hidden LinkedIn group [for high 
potentials]. It has 1,088 members worldwide […] of 
which 60 in Belgium […] I also notice it in my 
environment and with colleagues who are also in the 
[high potential] pool […] Everyone’s like « hey, 
congratulations, you made it, you’re with the lucky few 
now » […] It’s a bit like the high potentials are the 
winners and the rest are losers, frankly. (HP9.1) 
    3. Career advancement and planning  
     3.1. Transparency Being transparent about internal career 
opportunities 
[Company] has a program for high potentials and 
everyone knows that […] because you can tell from 
certain things. For example, I’ve been here six years and 
this is my fifth job […] The policy for hipos is that they 
should change positions quickly to get as much 
experience as possible […] But they don’t communicate 
openly about what the program implies and I find that 
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unfortunate […] I think it would be much, much better to 
openly discuss people’s available career options with 
them […] otherwise it’s a guessing game. (HP6.1) 
 3.2. Customization Setting up customized career tracks 
tailored to fit the high potential’s specific 
needs 
Once you’re on that [high potential] list, and you’re not 
satisfied in your job anymore […] they’ll say « OK, let’s 
look at all possible positions for you here at [company], 
what would you like to do next » […] I feel so 
comfortable in this situation because for many engineers 
there really aren’t that many options. (HP3.2) 
 3.3. Promotion opportunities Creating opportunities for promotion on a 
yearly basis 
I think promotions are important, not just because of the 
hierarchical aspect but also as a reward for your hard 
work […] It’s not like everybody has that goal of 
becoming a senior manager […] but in our organization, 
no one has to drop dead or retire before you can get 
promoted […] So if you’re not, you’ll see it as personal 
failure, like you didn’t do your job well […] If you do 
well, you’d automatically get promoted. (HP2.2) 
 3.4. Self-management Allowing career self-management from the 
side of the high potential 
I mean I can appreciate that they point out strengths and 
weaknesses to me or congratulate me on my strengths, but 
not that they are going to determine what my career will 
look like. And I don’t think they do that […] So I can’t 
say that I am on a standard career track or that they 
determine my career, or at least I hope not. (HP2.3) 
    4. Privileged position   
     4.1. Preferential treatment Giving preferential treatment to high 
potentials 
So when that person retired, I was kind of keen to take 
over the team leadership role, so they asked me for it 
because they knew I wanted it […] So I guess I made that 
clear to them, I don’t know, I knew chances were high the 
job would go to me […] And they gave it to me. (HP4.1) 
 4.2. Appreciation Showing appreciation for hard work It’s not that I necessarily feel the need to belong to this 
little club [of high potentials], I just want to do my job 
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well and be happy. Of course it is really great to be 
appreciated like this. So it’s more the other way around 
[…] I don’t work hard because I want to be part of that 
[high potential] club, I do my job well because I want to 
do it well and luckily they see that, they notice that and 
that’s a nice way to work. (HP8.1) 
 4.3. Responsibility Delegating higher levels of responsibility 
to high potentials 
[My current boss] always puts me in the spotlight. So 
instead of him reporting to the board about what I did and 
taking credit for it – as it so often happens – he’ll say « 
I’m going to let you do this, but do it well, because you’re 
the one who’s going to get called on it ». (HP4.2) 
 4.4. Impact Allowing high potentials to have an impact 
on management decisions 
[After working here for two years] I wrote a vision text 
about how I felt the organization was doing, evaluating it, 
and offering one or two suggestions for improvement that 
in my view required immediate action […] I told them to 
create a new type of function for me that would make my 
life so much easier […] And so they did, and they haven’t 
regretted it since. (HP5.1) 
 4.5. High-level projects Inviting high potentials to participate in 
high-level projects 
People who had a good evaluation and show that they can 
do more, something more difficult, are going to get more 
of the new high-level clients […] the others just keep the 
machine going […] When you start from zero, you can 
only get to a thousand and not below zero. When you’re 
already at a thousand and you need to keep the machine 
going, it’s much harder to get to 1,200 and no one will 
notice anyway […] but if you get from zero to fifty on a 
new project everyone will see […] You need those high-
profile things to get people’s attention. (HP2.2) 
    5. Financial rewards   
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 5.1. Salary Paying an equitable salary It’s a bit frustrating. Clearly, my perspective is a bit 
different from the average employee – I’m in HR myself, 
I have to okay all the salary decisions being made here. 
And so I know what the range is, and what everyone else 
is getting compared to what I’m getting […] I wonder, if 
I’m such a high potential, how come I’m making only 
half of what others are making who are at the same level, 
and who I know for a fact are not identified as high 
potentials? (HP7.2)  
 5.2. Bonuses Giving additional bonuses to high 
potentials 
They differentiate at the bonus level. In the beginning [of 
your career] it’s not that big, but the higher up you go it 
could mean 30, 40, 50% difference […] there’s no official 
communication, to avoid resentment […] But people try 
to measure themselves by comparing what others got […] 
otherwise you don’t know if yours is higher or lower than 
the rest. But you’ll find out where you are one way or 
another. (HP2.1) 
     
 
 
 
 
